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From a philosophical point of view, the
subject of Thomas Schramme’s article
seems to be well-known as he addresses
one of the most prominent debates in
both classical and contemporary philoso-
phy: the mind-body problem. Of course,
Schramme does not attempt to broadly
cover this general issue. He rather focuses
on the neglect of philosophical approaches
within the context of the search for a sound
definition of mental disorders that led to
conceptual as well as theoretical problems
for psychology and psychiatry. As a result
of this neglect, Schramme argues, psy-
chiatry is facing a make-believe dilemma
that implies either Cartesian dualism or
reductionism/eliminativism when trying
to save the notion of “mental disor-
der.” In a nutshell, this apparent dilemma
for current psychiatry goes as follows:
Either we try to save the notion of men-
tal disorder by claiming an independent
sphere of the mental and end up with
the implausibility of substance dualism.
Or we attempt to avoid this problem
by means of consistent somatization and
a naturalistic reduction of mental terms
and phenomena, thereby in fact dispos-
ing of any substantial meaning of mental
disorder. Hence, psychiatry seems to be
stuck “between the Scylla of reduction and
the Charybdis of dualism” (Schramme,
2013, p. 2).
As Schramme convincingly shows,
the prevailing acceptance of this alleged
dilemma in psychiatry is due to some
fundamental misconceptions and the
“limited awareness of the philosophi-
cal debate on the mind-body problem”
(Schramme, 2013, p. 1). He demon-
strates this claim by discussing two
prominent positions in the philosophy
of mind which—albeit in quite different
ways—eliminate the level of psycholog-
ical explanation and at the same time
any significant meaning of mental dis-
order: identity theory and eliminative
materialism. While his discussion nec-
essarily remains cursory, it covers the
most important objections against both
theories. For philosophers, the most sur-
prising aspect in Schramme’s analysis of
this rather well-known controversy con-
sists of the fact that psychiatry has so
far to a large extent ignored important
conceptual differentiations that could
help to avoid false conclusions like the
idea that the concept of mental disorder
compellingly implies “a Cartesian view of
the mind-body problem, that minds and
brains are separable and entirely distinct
realms, an approach that is inconsistent
with modern philosophical and neuro-
scientific views” (Stein et al., 2010, p.
1760). A closer look at those “modern
philosophical views” would have shown
that there is no necessary connection
between “mental” and substance dualism
but rather different (e.g., phenomeno-
logical and narrative) approaches that
try to define and describe a rich concept
of mental illness without falling back to
Cartesianism (for an overview see Perring,
2010).
Schramme succeeds in demonstrating
the general problems of reductive and
eliminative theories and shows that both
types of theories do not provide com-
pelling reasons for rejecting “the possibil-
ity of an independent conceptualization of
mental illness” (Schramme, 2013, p. 3).
Only to a lesser extent, however, does
he address the specific features of men-
tal illness that determine its conceptual
autonomy and immunize it against scien-
tific naturalism and reductive explanation.
As an extension to Schramme’s line of
argument, I will therefore briefly discuss
the case of posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD).
PTSD has become well-known in the
context of war veterans who were—
passively or actively—involved in extreme
forms of physical or psychological vio-
lence. After having returned from mis-
sion, sometimes years or even decades
later, some of them start to re-experience
certain episodes, for instance the unin-
tended killing of civilians. These episodes
appear as very lively, uncontrollable auto-
biographical memories that emotionally
affect the patient and inevitably arrest
his attention. By forcing the patient to
relive the traumatic experience again and
again, such memories create “black holes”
(Pitman and Orr, 1990, p. 469) in the nar-
rative reality of the person, unintentionally
attracting his attention without being able
to successfully integrate the remembered
event into his life story. While being an
inerasable part of the historic reality of
the person, it cannot at the same time
be accepted as truly belonging to oneself
and therefore cannot be integrated into the
persons’ narrative reality (Jungert, 2013, p.
202). Thus, there remains a foreign body
in the life story of the person that con-
stantly causes flashbacks and induces the
persons’ suffering from his past (Hampe,
2007, p. 92).
Why is PTSD a good example for
the irreducibility of psychological expla-
nation that Schramme seeks to defend?
Most notably, because it reveals the
fundamental problems that result from
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any attempt to reduce the internal per-
spective of human minds to the external
perspective on human brains. As described
above, traumatic disorder can be under-
stood as a break into a persons’ history
caused by the traumatic event. The aware-
ness of this break is tied to the cate-
gories of meaning and subjective reality—
the idea of something being true for
someone—which again can only be cap-
tured if one assumes some kind of mental
reality and the existence of an internal per-
spective. It is by reconstructing these inter-
nal perspectives that psychiatry is able to
get access to traumatic disorders and—
at least in some cases—to find a way
of dealing with them conjointly with the
patient.
As a matter of principle, even the most
sophisticated neuroscience or biological
psychiatry would not be able to approach
mental disorders like PTSD appropriately,
because the recognition or analysis of
internal perspectives is not part of their
methodological repertoire, nor can it be
grasped by its basic concepts. Instead, by
trying to describe psychological phenom-
ena exclusively by using somatic terms
and categories, they in fact eliminate those
perspectives, because “nothing is true for
somatic structures on their own, i.e., they
cannot be treated as something with an
internal perspective” (Hampe, 2007, p.
100). Saving the sphere of internal per-
spective, however, does not necessarily
imply to invoke substance dualism. In con-
sonance with Schramme’s reasoning, it is
enough to consider the mental and the
somatic dimension as phenomenologically
different, but complementary aspects of
one substance.
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